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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CARROLL FREEMAN, ANN MARIE FREE-
MAN, SIDNEY L. COHEN, KATHLEEN CO-
HEN, PLATO G. CHRISTAPULOS, STELLA 
A. CHRISTAPULOS, E. M. RICHARDSON, 
!\ENNETH R. POULSEN, VIRGINIA C. 
POULSEN, BENJAl\IIN N. MELDRUM, 
GRACE D. MELDRUM, ERWIN F. ZEYER, 
WILr,L\. GRACE ZEYER, EDWARD R. 
O'HARA, EILEEN O'HARA, OSCAR SOR-
ENSON, M. ALICE SORENSON, EARL E. .\ 
LO:VIAN, HELEN M. LOMAN, ROBERT E. 
themselves and for other land owners of 
Indian Rock Subdivision, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
LELAND 0. GEE, VILATE D. GEE, JAI\IES 
;,'. CRANEH and IDA CRANER, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case 
No.10590 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATE1\1ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
'rhis is an action commenced by residents of Indian 
Rock Subdivision (plaintiffs-appellants are referred to 
hereinafter as "plaintiffs"), a residential subdivision of 
Salt Lake County, located in the general vicinity of 20th 
~outh and 28th East Streets, in Salt Lake City (see sub-
division plat, Exhibit 2P), to enjoin, and to recover dam-
ages for, the violation of restrictive covenants by def end-
nnts-respondents (hereinafter referred to as "defend-
ants") who are also residents of the said subdivision. 
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DISPOSI1'ION I~ LO\Y~H COUR'l' 
On October 29, 19G5, a Pretrial Conference, Honor-
able Merrill C. Faux, Judge, presiding, was held, and re-
sulted in a preliminary ruling by the Trial Court that the 
restrictive covenants in question related only to the 
original construction of defendants' homes rather than 
also to the use made thereof by defendants. (R. GG.) 
Subsequently, there were motions to amend the original 
Pretrial Order ( R. 68, 70, 79-81), and pla~ntiffs filed their 
memorandum with respect to the interpretation of tlte re-
strictive covenants. (R. 90-108.) On December 13, 19G5, 
the Pretrial Conference was continued. 'rhereafter, on 
December 17, 1965, the Trial Court made and entered an 
Amended Pretrial Order (R. 74-78), and on December 
20, 1965, made and entered its Memorandum Decision 
( R. 109), rendering its interpretation of the restrictive 
covenants in question. Thereafter, the varties submitted 
proposed Orders to the Court pursuant to the decision of 
the Court. (R. 120-122, 123-125.) On January 13, 19G6, 
former counsel for plaintiffs, Messrs. Greenwood and 
Meservy of Salt Lake City, withdrew of record. (R. 110-
112.) Counsel appearing herein on behalf of plaintiffs 
made their appearance. (R. 113-114.) After further pro-
ceedings in the Trial Court, which are discussed in great-
er detail hereinafter, the Trial Court, on March 8, 1966, 
made and entered its Order dismissing plaintiffs' Com-
plaint with prejudice on the ground that the Complaint 
failed to state a cause of action against defendants for use 
of their residences for two-family occupancy. (R. 126-
128.) 
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RELIFJF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Although there are collateral issues presented for de-
eision on this appeal, the basic issue for decision is 
whether the Trial Court properly construed the restric-
tive cov0nants applicable to the lands and residences of 
ho th plaintiffs and defendants as not prohibiting de-
fendants' use of their residences for jncome-producing 
occupmwy by two families. Plaintiffs seek reversal of the 
Ordrr of the Trial Court dismissing plaintiffs' Complaint 
upon the basis of the Trial Court's interpretation of the 
covenants, and ask that the case be remanded for trial 
upon the merits. 
S'l'ATEMENT OF FACTS 
'rhe restrictive covenants applicable to Indian Rock 
Subdivision are appended to this brief as Appendix "A" 
for convenient reference by the Court. Covenant I of the 
covenants provides as follows: 
"Each and every lot above described shall be 
known and is he;eby designated as a 'Residential 
Lot' and no structure shall be erected, altered, 
placed or permitted to remain on any such 'Resi-
dential Lot' other than one detached single family 
dwelling not to exceed two stories in height and a 
private garage for no more than three automobiles, 
except that one detached single family dwelling 
or a duplex may he erected on each of Lots Nos. 
30, 31, 38, 39, and 41." (Exhibit 4P.) 
Defendants' residences are two-story homes, each so 
('Onstrncte<l as to have an entrance to the main floor and 
to the 1rnlk-out basement floor. Each floor is independent-
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ly equipped so as to be occupied by a :separate family. 
It is conceded and agreed that for a period of time pri~r 
to the initiation of this action, each of the defendants 
occupied the main floors of their respective dwellings 
and leased or rented the basement floors to other persons, 
so that, in the case of both residences, it is clear that there 
was occupancy by more than a single family, and that the 
residences were so constructed as to provide for such 
multiple residency. In fact, defendants' re::;idences are du-
plexes and have for some time been used as such. (Dep. 
James F. Craner, 2-4, 7-11; Dep. Leland 0. Ge~, 14-10, 
19-21, 22-23; Dep. Earl R. Belnap, 8-12.) 
The record establishes that the lot owned by def end-
ants Craner was acquired by a deed that expressly sub-
jected the conveyance to the covenants theretofore re-
corded. (Exhibit lP.) Similarly, the lot owned by de-
fendants Gee was acquired by the Gees on October 10, 
1961, from Earl R. Belnap, the builder retained by the 
Gees. (Exhibit 9P.) Belnap had acquired the lot on April 
5, 1960, by a deed that expressly subjected the conveyance 
to the covenants. (Exhibit 7P.) The policy of title in-
surance acquired by the Gees had appended to it a com-
plete copy of the covenants. (Exhibit 6P.) 
After plaintiffs' present counsel appeared in this ac-
tion, they filed a motion with the Trial Court for reca.n-
sideration of the various orders of the 'rrial Court inter-
preting the restrictive covenants. In connection with 
such motion, plaintiffs asked that they be relieved of .a 
statement apparently made to the Trial Court by thell' 
former counsel, Mr. Greenwood, to the effect that plain-
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tiff~ \H're not seeking any relief by way of demolition 
of defendants' residenC('S or any required change in the 
php;ical features of th(e homes. The Trial Court denied 
this rcilief and held that plaintiffs would be bound by the 
alleged statements of their former counsel. 
ARO U i\lEN'r 
POINT I. 
'l 1 ILG 'rRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS 
A~.!ENDBD PRETRIAL ORDER OF DECEM-
Bl~R 11', 1965, ITS MEMORANDUM DECI-
~ION OF DECEMBER 20, 1965, AND ITS 
ORDI<JR OF MARCH 8, 1966, IN CONSTRU-
1 NG THE INDIAN ROCK SUBDIVISION RE-
STR1,CTIVE COVENANTS AS NOT PRO-
! !IIWrING DEFI.iJNDANTS' USE OF LANDS 
r:: ~3A!D SUBDIVISION FOR MULTI-
F,\l\llLY ffWELLINGS. 
'11lic principal and narrow question for decision on 
this appeal is whether the Trial Court properly construed 
Covenant I of the covenants applicable to the Indian 
Rock 8ubdivision. That covenant provides in relevant 
riart that, 
'·[~~Jo structure shall he erected, altered, 
placed or permitted to remain on any such 'Resi-
dential Lot' other than one detached single family 
d',\'elli11g ... PXC('pt that one detached single family 
dw0lling or a duplex may be erected on each of 
Lots Kos. ;30, 31, 38, 39 and 41." (Exhibit 4P.) 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the meaning of 
this covenant is clear and unambiguous. The term "single-
family (h\'Plling" is used in contra-distinction to the term 
''cl11ph'x.'' In thPir Answers on file herein, each of defend-
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ants admits that their homes as originally constructed 
' and as used and maintained, constitute two-family rather 
than single-family dwellings.(R. 16-18, 19-20, 45-47, 48-50.) 
Plaintiffs therefore respectfully submit 1hat there can be 
no question that the construction of defendants' two-
family dwellings was in patent violation of the quoted 
covenant. Indeed, defendants have not contended that 
the construction of their two-family dwellings did not 
violate the covenants. 
Defendants contended in the Trial Court, however, 
that if the construction of their two-family dwelling:; 
violated these covenants, plaintiffs' sole remedy would be 
to require that the structures be demolished or altered so 
as to constitute single-family dwellings rather than two-
farnily dwellings. In other words, def en dun ts contend that 
once they have succeeded in violating the covenant, plain-
tiffs are without any remedy save to require demolition. 
In so contending, defendants take the position, sustained 
by the Trial Court, that the quoted covenant imposes no 
restriction whatever upon the use of a structure once it 
has been erected-that the covenant restricts construc-
tion onl~', and has no relation to or bearing upon use. 
This contention, and the various decisions and orders 
of the Trial Court based thereon, are contrary to the 
clear meaning and intent of the quoted covenant, and 
violate established principles governing the interpretation 
of restrictive covenants like the covenants here at issuP. 
A very few courts appear to have distinguished between 
covenants restricting construction only and covenants 
restricting use, and have held that a covenant which ap-
j Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
pears to restrict construction only will not restriet subse-
quent use of a structure once erected. 
DELA WARE: Daniels Gardens v. Hilyard, 29 Del. 
Ch. 33(), 49 A.2d 721 ( 1946). 
PENNSYLVANIA: Jones v. Park Lane for Con-
i·alesccnts, Inc., 384 Pa. 268, 120 A.2d 535 (1956); 
see dissent of Bell, J., joined by Stearne, J. 
Contra: Gerstell v. Knight, 345 Pa. 86, 26 A.2d 
:t~9 (1942); Pehlert v. Neff, 152 Pa. Super. 84, 
31 A.2d 446 ( 1943). 
GJ~ORGIA: Jordan v. Orr, 209 Ga. 161, 71 S.E. 2d 
20() (1952). 
'rhese decisions however, to the extent, if at all that 
they support defendants' claim, are contrary to the vast 
\reight of authority. 'l'he overwhelming majority of cases 
follow the far more persuasive and logical view that if a 
restridive covenant precludes a property owner from 
erecting a structure of a certain kind, the same covenant, 
logically and reasonably, must be deemed to prohibit use 
of a structure once erected for the same purposes as were 
intended to be avoided by the prohibition of the restricted 
structures. 
ARIZONA: Ainsworth v. Elder, 40 Ariz. 71, 9 P.2d 
1007 ( 1932). 
CALIFORNIA: Walker v. Haslett, 44 C.A. 394, 186 
Pac. 622 (1919); Bernstein v. Minney, et al., D6 
Cal. App. 597, 274 Pac. 614 (1929) (dictum). 
CONNECTICUT: Hooker v. Alexander, 129 Conn. 
433, 29 A.2d 308 (1942). 
ILLINOIS: Simons v. Work of God Corp., 3G Ill. 
App. 2d 19D, 183 N.E. 2d 729 (1962). 
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KEN'rUCKY: Meyer v. Stein, 284 Ky. -±97, 145 S.W. l 
2d 105 (1940). 
l\lASSAiCHCSETTS: Po1cers v. Radding, 225 .:\Ia8,,, ' 
110, 113 N.E. 782 (1916). 
MICHIGAN: Zelinski v. Becker, 318 l\lich. 209, ~I 
N.W. 2d 615 (1947); Wood v. Blancke, 304 Mich. 
283, 8 N.W. 2d 67 (1943); Michiana Shores Es-
tates, Inc. v. Robbins, 290 Mich. 38-±, 287 N.W. 
5-±7 (1939); Nerrerter v. Little, 258 l\1ich. -tG~, 
:2-13 K.W. 25 (1932); Boston-Edison Protectire 
Assa. v. Goodlove, 248 :Mich. 625, 227 N.W. 172 
(1929); Holderness v. Central Sta.tes Financl' 
Corp., 241 Mich. 604, 217 N.W. 764 (1928). 
l\UNNESOTA: Burger v. City of St. Paul, 2-tl Minn. 
285, G-1 N.W. 2d 73 (1954); Stra.uss v. Ginzberg, 
218 Minn. 57, 15 N.W. 2d 130 (1944). 
NEBRASKA: Hague v. Dreeze-n, 161 Neb. 268, i3 
N.E. 2d 159 (1955). 
NE\V JERSEY: Rosenblatt v. Levin, 127 N.J. Eq. 
207, 12 A.2d 627, aff'd 1941, 129 N.J. Eq. 103, lS 
A.2d 267 (1940) 
NEW YORK: Kiernan v. Snou·den, 123 N.Y.S. ~d 
895 (1953); Nielsen v. lliral Realty Corp., 172 
::\lisc. 408, 16 N.Y.S. 2d 462 (1939); Neidlinger 
v. N !'W York Ass'n. Etc., 121 Misc. 276, 200 
"N .Y.S. 852 ( 1923) ; Bawnert v . . "fl(folkin, 235 N.Y. 
115, 139 N.E. 210 (1923); Goodhue v. Pen11ell, 
164 App. Div. 821, 150 N.Y.S. 435 (191-1). 
OKLAHOMA: Mattson v. Fezler, 202 Okl. 589, 21fi 
P.2d 275 ( 1949) ; Southwest Petroleion Company 
v. Logan, 180 Okl. 4'77, 71 P.2d 759, 763 (1937). 
TEXAS: Walker v. Dorris, 206 S.W. 2d G20 ('!'Px. 
Civ. App., 1947). 
YIRGINIA: Scl1warzchild v. Wellwrne, 186 Ya. 105~ 
-1-:5 R.E. 2d 152 (1947) 
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WISCONSIN: Joyce v. Conway, 7 Wis. 2d 2-17, 9G 
x.w. :2d 530 ( 1959). 
Accordingly, in Joyce v. Conway, supra, the Wiscon-
sin ~upreme Court held that a cownant against the erec-
tion of any building other than a one-family or singk• 
dwelling house prohibited the conversion o.f a structure 
oncP erl'cted to a two-apartment building so that it could 
h~ occupied otherwise than as a one-family dwelling house. 
In Kiernan v. Snowden, supra, the Supreme Court 
of ?\" ew York held that a covenant against the erection of 
any structure other than a single-family dwelling house 
precluded the use of such a house, once erected, as a room-
ing housP. 
In 8 imons v. Work of Go.d Corp., supra, the Illinois 
Appdlah• Court held that a covenant that no apartment 
or 1:>trueture for the separate housekeeping of more than 
one family should be built or maintained upon a lot was 
not nwrely a building restriction, but was also a use re-
striction. 
In ·walker v. Haslett, supra, the California Appellate 
Court held that a covenant prohibiting erection of any 
lmilding other than a "first-class private residence" pro-
hibitPd the use of a building already erected as a "double 
or duplex house, or for any purpose tha:i that of a private 
l'PsidPnce." (lSG P.2d 622 at 625.) 
In Southwest Petroleum Comparvy v. Log·O!n, supra, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the covenant 
langnag1• ''all lots in this plat are restricted to residences 
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only" to prohibit "all other uses upon the land ... " (il 
P.2d 759 at 763.) 
In Burger v. City of St. Paul, supra, the 1\linne~ota 
Supreme Court held that: 
''A use restriction or covenant restricting the 
erection of any building except for residential pnr-
poses of a prescribed type applies to the use as 
well as to the character of the building." ( 6-± N.W. 
2d 73 at 80.) 
In Hague v. Dreezen, supra, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court held that a covenant proscribing erection of certain 
classes of buildings "were intended to and had the pur-
pose and effect of limiting the use of the lots to dwelling 
houses, consisting of one dwelling house on each lot." 
(73 N.W. 2d 159at164.) 
Defendants rely on Jordan v. Orr, sitpra, and Jones 
v. Park Lane for Convalescents, Inc., supra. Plaintiffs re-
spectfully submit that the extent to which these decisions, 
if in fact they support defendants' view of this case, are 
contrary to reason and the great weight of authority is 
well-stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Bell in the 
Jones case: 
"In my opinion the parties clearly intended 
'that the said property shall lJe used only for . · · 
private dwellings and appurtenances.' The major-
ity opinion limits the restriction to original erec-
tion and permits a private dwelling house, one day 
after erection, to be thereafter radically altered 
and 'ilsed' for an entirely different purpose. That 
is contrary to the language, meaning and i~t:nt 
of the restriction. Although the majority opmwn I 
is careful not to say so, it logically and necessanly 
I 
J 
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holds that the owner of the servient tenarnent can 
one month or oue day after the erection of a pri-
vate dwelling completely remodel the interior or 
t•xterior of the private dwelling or both, and since 
the restriction has no application to use-which 
ignores its 11se provision and clear intent-change 
it into and 11se it for a store or a commercial build-
ing or a sanitarium or a building for any and every 
other conceivable itse. I believe this is so unreason-
able as to be absurd. 
''.Whenever two interpretations of a written 
instrument are reasonably possible, and one con-
struction produces a reasonable result which is 
in accord with the likely or clearly possible ob-
jPd, purpose and intent of the parties and the 
other construction produces a result which is un-
reasonable or absurd, the latter construction 
should never be adopted." (Emphasis in original.) 
(120 Atl. 525 at 540.) 
It cannot be doubted that to sustain the Trial Court, 
and the view urged by defendants, would encourage 
property owners to erect buildings secretly in violation 
of so-called construction covenants, for once the build-
ings were completed, they could be used for any purpose. 
The record in this case establishes that such a 
eonrse of deception and concealment was indeed pur-
~ued by at least two o.f the defendants i~ this litigation. 
It is a matter of record in this case that defendant Le-
land 0. Gee assured his neighbors in Indian Rock Sub-
division in writing during the course of construction of 
the Gee home that it would be occupied only by the Gees 
and their family, and that it would not be used for 
income purposes. (Exhibit lOP.) The Answer on file 
an<l a Jlart of the record in this appeal establishes be-
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yond doubt that from the very beginning, defendants 
Gee planned and carried forward the construction of a 
two-family dwelling with full purpose and intent that 
it be occupied by two separate families and used for in-
come purposes. ( R. 19-20, 45-47 ; see also Dep. Leland 
0. Gee, 16-17, 19-21.) 
The record establishes with equal clarity that the 
Craner dwelling was designed and planned from the 
beginning as a two-family d\\Telling ( R. lG, 49), notwith-
standing that defendant Craner was aware of the re-
striction prohibiting buildings other than single-fam;ly 
dwellings. ( Dep. J arnes F. Craner, 5.) 
The decision of the Trial Court interpreting the 
covenants applicable to Indian Rock Subdivision was 
rendered as a matter of law. No evidence was before the 
Trial Court bearing upon the intention of the draftsmen 
of the covenants. As this Court held in Parrish v. Rich-
ards, 8 U. 2d 419, 336 P. 2d 122 (1959), thE> interpretation 
of restrictive covenants is governed by the same prin-
ciples as are applicable to the interpretation of statutes. 
It is, of course, settled that the intention of the legisla-
tnn' is a consideration of the greatest importance in 
the interpretation of statutes. Accordingly, and on the 
same principles, the intention of those who prepared and 
caused to be recorded the restrictive covenants appli-
caMe to Indian Rock Subdivision is a matter of the 
greatest importance in rendering the proper interpreta-
tion of the covenants. 
The primary evidence of the intent of those who 
prepared and recorded the subject covenants is, of course. 
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the content of the covenants themselves. Plaintiffs re-
~pectfully submit that the covenants themselves express 
a manifest and clear intention to restrict the utilization 
of lots in Indian Rock Subdivision to occupancy by one 
family per dwelling. The overriding and paramount 
purpose of restrictive covenants such as those here at 
i'ssue is to protect, preserve and maintain the value and 
integrity of properties subject to the covenants. Plain-
tiffs have invested in their dwelling sites and improve-
ments in reliance upon cnvenants providing for restric-
tion to single-family occupancy. Defendants would con-
vert the Indian Rock Subdivision into a neighborhood 
of rental multiple-family properties. 
Even if the intent of the Indian Rock Subdivision 
covenants is regarded as ambiguous with respect to the 
r1uestion whether they control subsequent use as well as 
original construction, the Trial Court erred. As has 
been noted, the Trial Court had before it no evidence 
other than the covenants themselves of the intention of 
the parties. 
"'l'he surrounding circumstances are taken into 
consideration in determining the intention in some 
cases, where it is necessary to do so by reason of 
the uncertainty or ambiguity in the language 
giving rise to the restriction. In such a case, the 
location and character of the entire tract of land, 
and whether or not the restriction is for the sole 
benefit of the grant or for the benefit of the 
grantee and subsequent purchasers, as well as 
Y>hether it is in pursuance of a general building 
plan for the development and improvement of the 
property, must be considered. The object or pur-
pnsl' which the covenant was designed to accom-
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plish is also taken into consideration." (20 Aiu. 
J ur. 2d, Section 186, "Covenants, Conditions 
Etc., pp. 754-755.) ' 
Accordingly, this Court, in III etropolitan Inv. Cu. v. Sine 
) 
14 U. 2d 36, 37G P.2d 9-±0 (19G2), found a reshietiw 
covenant "ambiguous and subject to interpretation [as I 
to duration] considering the intentions of the parties at 
I 
the time of its imposition" and held: 1 
''Tht> intentions of the parties, as gatlwred froll! I 
the sunounding circumstances, and purpOSl' of i 
the restriction, must be considt-rt>d and giwn 
effeet." (l-!: U. 2d 3G at -±3.) 
Defendants have contended, and the Trial Court in 
this case held, that the ambiguity that defendants assert 
and the Trial Court apparently found in these coven-
ants should be resolved in favor of the unrestricted me 
of defendants' properties. This principle, however, is 
subject to limitations apparentl)· disregarded by de-
fendants and not considered by the Trial Court. 
''Such construction in favor of the unrestricted 
use, however, must be reasonable. The strict 
rule of construction as to restrictions should not 
be applied in such a way as to def eat the plain 
and ohvious purposes of a restriction. (20 Am. 
J ur. 2d Section 187, "Covenants, Conditions, 
F~tc.," pp. 756-757.) 
In summary, plaintiffs respectfully urge that as a 
matter of law and based upon the overwhelming weight 
of authority, the admitted use that defendants have 
made and are making of their properties violates t]H' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
j 
I 
I 
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lmlian Hock Subdivision covenants. If, however, this 
Court should accept defendants' view that the covenants 
are ambiguous as to whether they restrict use as well 
as construction, then plaintiffs urge that the case should 
be remanded for trial on the merits so that proper evi-
(knce of the intention of the parties can be adduced 
for the purpose of resolving the claimed ambiguity. In 
Pither event, the decision of the Trial Court peremptor-
ily and as a matter of law defining away defendants' 
rights as property owners, and as beneficiaries of the 
to·wnants, should be overturned. 
POINT II 
'L'llE 'l'RIAL COURT ERRED IN JTS ORDER 
OF MARCH 8, 1966, IN DENYING PLAIN-
'l'LF'FS' 1\IOTION THAT 'l'HEY BE RELIEV-
ED OF THE EFFECT OF STATEMENTS 
,\lADE TO THE TRIAL COURT BY PLAIN-
TIFFS' FORMER COUNSEL. 
It appears from the record that at some point in the 
pretrial proceedings, plaintiffs' former counsel, Messrs. 
Gn•mwood and .Meservy, may have advised the Trial 
Court that the plaintiffs were not seeking demolition or 
an.\· change in the outward physical aspects of the de-
f Pndants' two-family dwellings. Immediately upon ap-
lH'aring on behalf of plaintiffs, the undersigned applied 
to the Trial Court to be relieved of this statement on 
the ground that it was apparently made to the Trial 
Court upon the basis of a misunderstanding between 
plaintiffs and their then counsel, and upon the further 
ground that under the view of this case taken hy the 
lll1(1c·rsi "'lled too·ether with the view of the Indian Rock 
b ' b 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8ubdivision restrictive covenants taken by defendants, 
vlaintiffs would he entitled to require demolition 01 
alteration o.f defendants' two-family dwellings. The Trial 
Court treated the alleged statement of prior counsel as 
a formal stipulation abandoning relief originally sought 
in plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended Complaint, and 
incorporated the abandonment in its final order of dis-
missal over the objections of plaintiffs' present cnun::;d 
(R. 126-128.) 
It is, of course, settled that the court may relieve 
parties of stipulations. ( 50 Am. J ur. § § 11, 14, "Stipula-
tions," pp. 611-614.) .Moreover, the statement apparently 
made by plaintiffs' former counsel certainly does nut 
rise to the level of a stipulation, and would have been, 
at most, a stat1m1ent of counsel's intentions with re:,;peet I 
to this case. 'l'he statement contained in the Trial Court's II 
order of dismissal so indicated. ( R. 126.) Accordingly, 
plaintiffs respectfully urge that the refusal of the Trial 
Court to permit plaintiffs' counsel to pursue this ca~r 
and to undertake the protection of the plaintiff8' righto 
and interest in conforrnity with present counsel's vie1r 
of the case and the instructio.ns of the plaintiffs was a 
manifest abuse of discretion that alone warrants the 
reversal of th(" decision made by the Trial Court. Again, 
there were not sufficient facts before the Trial Court 
upon ·which the Trial Court could have decided whether 
pl:>.intiffs were entitled to the relief that the Trial Court 
now has held plaintiffs cannot seek in any event. 'l'lw 
decision of the Trial 'Court, of course, does not purporl 
to he a decision on the merits on this point but merely 
Sf·Pks to bind plaintiffs to a claimed abandonment of 
relief sought under the terms of plaintiffs' Complaint 
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and Amended Complaint and now sought by plaintiff:::;' 
present counsel. 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the refusal of 
tlw 'l'rial Court to permit plaintiffs to seek the relief 
to which they may be entitled on the facts provides a 
sound and important basis for overturning the order of 
dismissal entered by the Trial Court and. remanding this 
ruse for trial on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Trial Court 
committed error in misconstruing the Indian Rock Sub-
division covenants in a vacuum, without any considera-
tion of the manifest and obvious purposes for ·which the 
covenants were adopted and without taking into account 
the intentions of the parties who prepared the covenants 
and caused them to be recorded. Further, plaintiffs sub-
mit that the Trial Court erred in unduly and prejudicially 
l'Pstricting the remedies available to plaintiffs for de-
fendants' violations of the covenants. Upon these grounds, 
plaintiffs urge that the order o.f dismissal of the Trial 
Court be reversed and that the case be remanded for 
trial upon the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
YAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Leonard J. Lewis 
C. Keith Rooker 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff s-Appclla nts 
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APPJ::;NDIX "A" 
BUILDING RES'l'RICTlONS 
INDIAN ROCK SUBDIVISION 
Kl\OvY ALL l\IEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That the undersigned owners of the following described 
real property situated in Salt Lake County State of . ' 
Utah: 
All of Lots 1 to ±1, both inclusive INDIAN ROCK 
Subdivision, according to the official plat therPof 
on file in the office of the County Recorder of 
Salt Lake County, Utah, 
hereby declare that all and each of said lots above des-
cribed shall be subject to and shall be eonveyed subject 
to the Reservations, Restrictions and Covenants here-
inafter set forth. 
I 
Each and every lot above described shall be known and 
is hereby designated as a "Residential Lot" and no struc-
ture shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted to re-
main on any such "Residential Lot" other than one de- , 
tached single family dwelling not to exceed two stories 
in height and a private garage for not more than three 
automobiles, except that one detached single farnily I 
dwelling or a duplex may be erected 0n each of Lots 
Nos. 30, 31, 38, 39, and 41. 
II 
Every dwelling erected on any of the following de~- 1· 
cribed lots : Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 28, 29, 32 and 33. shall han 
I 
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a ground floor 1:>quare foot area, exclusive of open 
porches or attached garages, of not less than 1200 square 
fret. All other lots not less than 1400 square feet. 
III 
X o building 1:>hall be erected, placed o.r altered on any 
building plot in this subdivision until the building plans, 
specifications, and plot plan showing the location of 
such building have been approved in writing as to con-
fonnity and harmony of external design with existing 
structures in the subdivision, and as to location of the 
building with respect to topography and finished ground 
elevation, by a committee composed of Richard R. Hoyt, 
.T ohn Glauser and J. Alvon Glauser, or by a representa-
tive designated by a majority of the membern of said 
committee. In the event of death or resignation of any 
member of said committee, the remaining member or 
members shall have full authority to approve or disap-
prove such design and location or to designate a repre.-
8entative with like authority. In the event said committee, 
Oi' its designated representative, fails to approve or dis-
approve such design and location within 30 days, after 
~aid plans and specifications have been submitted to 
it or, in any event, if no suit to enjoin the erection o.f 
sud1 building or the making of such alterations has been 
commenced prior to the completion thereof, such ap-
proval will not be required and this Covenant will ,be 
dc•emed to have been fully complied with. Neither the 
nwmbers of such committee, nor its de~ignated repre-
8c•ntative shall be entitled to any compensation for ser-
\'ices performed pursuant to this Covenant. The powers 
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and dufo>s of such committee, and its designated repre. 
sentative, shall ccase on and after l\lay 1st, 1957, then 1 
after, the a11proval described in this covenant shall not ! 
be required unless prior to said date and effectiw 
thereon, a written instrument shall be executed by t] 11, 
then record owners o.f a majority of the lots in thi~ 
subdivision and duly recorded appointing a representa-
tive, or representatives, who shall thereafter exercise the 
same powers previously exernised by said committee. 
IY 
No building shall be locatt>d nearer to the front resi-
dential lot line than the building limit line as shown on 
the recorded plat of said Indian Rock. However, covered 
or uncovered, but not enclosed porches, balconies, pork 
cocheres, or terraces may extend beyond the building 
limit line not more than 12 feet, and eustornar~· archi-
tectural ap1mrtenances, such as cornicPs, bay windo\\'> 
spoutings, chimneys, may extend not more than four 
feet beyond said building line. ~teps leading to dwelling 
may extend beyond such building line provided such 
steps are not higher than the floor level of the first , 
floor of the dwelling. No building shall be located nearer 
to either side line of a residential lot than 8 feet. No 
residential structure shall be erected or placed on an)· 
building plot, which plot has an area of less than GJOO 
square feet or a width of less than 70 feet at the front ' 
building setback line. 
v 
No noxious of offensive trade or activity shall be carried 
on upon any residential lot hereinbefore described or 
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an:; part or portion thereof, nor shall anything be done 
thereon which may become an annoyance or nuisance to 
(]w oecnpants of the remaining residential lots herein-
before described. 
VI 
:lo traih·r, basement, tent, shack, garage, or other out-
lmilding erected in, upon or about any of said residential 
lots hereinbefore described or any part thereof shall at 
any time be used as a residence temporarily or perman-
ently, nor shall any structure of a temporary character 
he used as a residence. 
VII 
':\o structure shall be moved onto any residential lot 
herrinbefore described or any part thereof unless it 
meets with the approval of the Committee hereinbefore 
named, such approval to be given in writing. 
VIII 
X o signs, billboards or advertising structures may be 
erected or displayed on any of the residential lots here-
inbefore described or parts or portions of said resi-
dPntial lots except that a single sign, not more than 3 x 5 
f Pet in size, advertising a specific lot for sale or house 
for rent, may be displayed on the premises affected. 
IX 
Xo trash, ashes or any other refuse may be thrown or 
dumped on any residential lots hereinbefore described 
01· any part or portion thereof. 
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x 
All covenants and restrictions herein stated and set forth 
shall run with the land and shall be binding on all the 
parties and persons claiming any interest in said resi-
dential lots hereinbefore described or any part thereof 
until 25 years from the date hereof, at which time said 
covenants and restrictions shall be automatically ex-
tended for successive periods of 10 years unless by a 
vote of the majority of the then owners of said residen-
tial lots, it is agreed to change the said covenants in 
whole or in part. 
XI 
H the parties now claiming any interest in said mi-
dential lots hereinbefore described, or any of them, or 
their heirs, successors, grantees, personal representatire 
or assigns, shall violate or attempt to ·violate any of the 
covenants and restrictions herein contained prior to 20 
years from the date hereof, it shall be lawful for any 
other verson O·r persons owing any other residential 
lot or lots in said area to prosecute any proceedings at 
law or in equit against the person or persons, firms or 
corporations so violating or attempting to violate any 
such covenant or covenants and/or restrictions or rr· 
striction, and either prevent him or them from so doing 
or to recover damages or other dues for such violation 
or violations. 
XII 
Invalidation of any one of the covenants and restriction; 
hereinbefore set forth by judgment or court order shall 
in no "·ise affect any of the other provisions hereof which 
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~hall remain in full force and effect until 25 years from 
the date hereof subject to automatic extension as pro-
vidPd in Paragraph X hereof. 
STA 'T'E OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
s/ Lena Glauser 
s/ John Glauser 
s/ Richard R. Hoyt 
s/ Maude S. Hoyt 
Owners 
On the 25th day of April, A.D. 1952 personally ap-
111•ared before me JOHN GLAUSER and LENA GLAUS-
l~R. his wife, and RICHARD R. HOYT and MAUDE S. 
HOYT, his wife, the signers of the foregoing instrument, 
\rho duly acknowledged to me that they executed the 
~amP. 
iSlGAL) 
LUCILE R. WRIGHT 
NOTARY PUBLIC, 
residing at: 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
~ry commission expires 12/10 /55. 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF FTAH 
Conni~· of Salt Lake 
Lss r· 
I, Hazel Taggart Chase, Recorder in and for the County 
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the 
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foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the original 
Building restriction No. 1283GG2, as appears of record 
in my o.f fice. 
lN Wl'l'NESS WHEREOF, l have 
hereunto set mv hand and affixed DIY 
official seal, tl;is 21st day of Septen;. 
her, A.D. 1965. 
By H. S. Ensign 
Deputy Recorder 
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